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Ma: Ma: Tale of Two Policies

A Tale of Two Policies: Corporate
Immunity and Its Negative
Externalities, The Worst of Times for
Consumers
Kaneffv. Del. Title Loans, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
Need quick cash? Payday lenders understand. A short-term loan for instant
cash may seem like a good idea at the time, but once borrowers realize that payday lenders charge interest rates three times the actual loan, a feeling of borrower's remorse inevitably sets in. Help is on the way, however. State legislatures
are reacting by crafting regulations and consumer protection laws criminalizing
the issuance of such loans. 2 This legislative action indicates the existence of a
serious societal problem. By choosing to punish payday lenders, state legislatures
are pinpointing an area of severe corporate abuse. Regulation is targeted at combating that abuse.
When the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kaneff v. Del. Title Loans, Inc.,
faced a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited payday loans,' the Third Circuit refused to enforce the state statute. This note will explore the reasoning underlying
and discuss the effects of the Third Circuit's decision, providing a consequential
look at the externalities that Kaneff created. As will become evident, these effects
are quite serious and far-reaching, both to Pennsylvania's citizens and Pennsylvania's regulatory scheme.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Tia Kaneff resided in Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania, situated approximately thirty miles from the Delaware border.4 In November 2005, Kaneff traveled to
Delaware to obtain a car title loan from Delaware Title Loans (DTL). 5 The loan
agreement included an arbitration provision, requiring both parties to arbitrate any
disputes and designating Delaware as the choice of law.6 Kaneff would later find
several provisions within the arbitration agreement objectionable. First, the
agreement stipulated that the lender (DTL) was not required to enter arbitration

1. 587 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 2009).
2. See Tara Shinnick, State RegulationofPayday Loans, 29 A.L.R 6th 461, pt. I, § 2 (2007).
3. See 41 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201 (West current through Act 2010-60).
4. Kaneffv. Delaware Title Loans, Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 2009).
5. Id. The court noted that Kaneff "is representative of a low income borrower." Id. Kaneff had
just separated from her husband and had moved into a new apartment with her two children. Id She
worked as a frozen food manger at a supermarket. Id.
6. Idat 619.
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prior to repossessing the vehicle through self-help.7 Second, the arbitration provision included a waiver of all class action claims by a borrower.! Third, the arbitration clause allocated unfavorable costs to the consumer.9 Specifically, borrowers were required to pay a $125filing fee and all of their own expenses in arbitration, including attorney fees.' 0 Last, a severance provision stipulated that the
arbitration agreement was to be enforced regardless of whether any other specific
provisions were invalid."
As for the loan itself, Kaneff borrowed a total of $550, payable one month
from the issuance of the loan.12 This total included a fifty dollar charge for recording the car lien and for insurance costs.' 3 DTL charged an annual interest rate
of 300.01% for the $550 loan amount.14 Including interest, Kaneff owed DTL a
total of $685.62, due in its entirety on December 23, 2005.'1 However, Kaneff
misunderstood the payment terms of her loan.' 6 She believed that her loan was for
six months, requiring her to make six individual payments of $136.1 Proceeding
under this mistaken assumption, Kaneff began making her monthly payments on
December 30, 2005.'8 After six months of doing so, Kaneff had paid DTL a total
of $842.50.19 In June 2006, Kaneff contacted DTL only to learn that she still
2
owed the payday lender $783.20 Kaneff refused to pay DTL more money. 1 In
response, DTL repossessed Kaneff s car on September 21, 2006.22
Kaneff filed a putative class action against DTL in Pennsylvania state court.23
The Pennsylvania state court granted Kaneffs preliminary injunction seeking the
return of her vehicle.24 Using the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,25 DTL suc26
cessfully moved to transfer the dispute to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
DTL then moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the loan agreement with Kaneff.27 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted DTL's motion and dismissed
the case with prejudice.28 Subsequently, Kaneff appealed the dismissal to the
Third Circuit. The Third Circuit held that the class arbitration waiver was not
unconscionable under Pennsylvania law and because the cost splitting provision
7. Id.
8. Id at 620.
9. Kaneff v. Delaware Title Loans, Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2009).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 619.
12. Id. at 618.
13. Id
14. Id.
15. Kaneff,587 F.3d at 619.
16. Id.
17. Id. In fact, the total amount of interest that she owed was $135.62 for one month. Id.
18. Id
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Kaneff 587 F.3d at 619.
23. Id.
24. Kaneff, 587 F.3d at 619. In seeking her preliminary injunction against DTL, Kaneff argued the
necessity of her vehicle to continue working at her job. Id.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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was unconscionable, but severable, the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable under Pennsylvania law.29
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. UnconscionableCost Provisionsin Arbitration
In Green Tree FinancialCorp.-Ala v. Randolph, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed an arbitration provision that the plaintiff alleged was unconscionable due
to cost allocations. 30 The Court's decision is relevant to Kaneff for two reasons.
First, Green Tree provided an early opportunity for litigants to establish unconscionability due to prohibitively expensive arbitration costs. In Kaneff the borrower alleged that the cost-splitting provision was unconscionable because arbitration would be prohibitively expensive for her. This was the same argument made
in Green Tree.3 1 The Court's early discussion of arbitration costs in Green Tree
can provide context for the Third Circuit's treatment of the cost-splitting provision
in Kaneff Second, the Court in Green Tree explained that its primary concern
was preserving vindication of statutory rights. 32 The court in Kaneff not only
refused to preserve consumers' statutory rights but effectively destroyed consumers' statutory rights, which were codified in the Pennsylvania usury statute. The
Court's focus and emphasis on preserving statutory vindication can be contrasted
with Kaneffs denial of such rights.
Green Tree involved a dispute between a financier and purchaser of a mobile
home.33 The purchaser argued that because the arbitration provision remained
silent on allocation of costs, the agreement was unconscionable because it created
a "risk that she will be required to bear prohibitive arbitration." 34 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed, holding that an arbitration agreement, silent on costs, was unenforceable "because it posed a risk that Randolph's ability to vindicate her statutory
rights would be undone by steep arbitration costs."35 However, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that an arbitration agreement that remains "silent"
on arbitration costs was not unconscionable, unless the litigant could prove his or
her actual inability to bear those costs. 36
According to the Court, "a party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive bears the
burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs."37 Of utmost concern to
the Court was that "the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her]
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum." 38 Conceding that "the existence of
large arbitration costs may well preclude a litigant ... from effectively vindicating
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Kaneffv. Delaware Title Loans, Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 624-25 (3d Cir. 2009).
531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000).
Kaneff, 587 F.3d at 624.
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
Id. at 82.
Id at 90.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 91-92.
Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (internal quotations omitted).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

3

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2010, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 9

482

JOURNAL OFDISPUTERESOLUTION

[Vol. 2010

such rights," the Court pointed out that by remaining "silent" on the issue, the
arbitration clause included no such large costs.39 In the present case, the purchaser
provided no evidence that he actually would bear such expensive arbitration
costs.4 Because the purchaser failed to prove that the arbitration clause would
likely force him to incur large arbitration costs, he failed to prove that he could not
"vindicate his statutory right in the arbitral forum."41 Although providing an early
standard for invalidating arbitration provisions due to cost provisions, Green Tree
discussed neither class action waivers nor the effects of such waivers on statutory
rights. However, after Green Tree, Pennsylvania state courts and the Third Circuit did consider class actions as a vehicle to preserve vindication of statutory
rights.

B. ClassArbitration Waivers Unconscionableunder PennsylvaniaLaw
Prior to Kaneff, Pennsylvania state courts addressed Pennsylvania public policy regarding class arbitration waivers, generally disfavoring class waivers.42 Yet,
Kaneff upheld a class arbitration waiver under Pennsylvania law. According to
the court in Kaneff Pennsylvania state cases reflected Pennsylvania's public policy prohibiting corporate immunity, not class waivers.43 Discussing the conflicting
views between the Pennsylvania courts and the Third Circuit over Pennsylvania
policy regarding class waivers is relevant for two reasons. First, these cases detail
the progression and development of Pennsylvania law on class action waivers
leading up to Kaneff Second, the Third Circuit, interpreting Pennsylvania state
courts, held that Pennsylvania public policy prohibited corporate immunity three
months prior to Kaneff" Yet, Kaneffhad the effect of creating corporate immunity. Therefore, discussing cases decided by Pennsylvania state courts and the Third
Circuit before Kaneffhighlights Kaneffs dramatic deviation from the Third Circuit
and Pennsylvania precedent.
In Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., the Superior Court of Pennsylvania addressed a class action arbitration waiver within a service contract between a consumer and a cable television provider.4 5 Because the Third Circuit decided Kaneff
under Pennsylvania law, the Pennsylvania state court's interpretation of class
action waivers would be relevant to the Third Circuit's decision in Kaneff In
Thibodeau, the consumer represented a class of individual consumers alleging that
the provider had improperly billed consumers for unnecessary equipment." The
3 9. Id.
40. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90.
4 1. Id.
42. See Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 596 A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (allowed class
action arbitration although the arbitration agreement was silent on the issue); Lytle v. CitiFinancial
Servs., Inc. 810 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super Ct. 2002); McNulty v. H & R Block, 843 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2004); Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 883 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) ("even language
which appears to be facially neutral can nonetheless be unconscionable if its effect is one-sided").
43. Cronin v. CitiFinancial Servs., Inc., 74 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 630, 635 (3d Cir. 2009), afg
2009 WL 1033613 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2009).
44. Cronin, 74 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 635.
45. Thibodeau, 912 A.2d at 877.
46. Id. The consumer had subscribed to basic cable. Id. Pursuant to the agreement, the consumer
was required to pay monthly charges for use of a cable convertor box and remote control. Id. Subse-
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central issue was whether the class action waiver was unconscionable under Pennsylvania law.47 The superior court noted that Pennsylvania law generally favored
class action arbitration.48 In addition, precedent suggested that class action arbitration waivers were considered unconscionable under Pennsylvania law.49 Appraising these prior state law cases, the superior court concluded, "if the costs
associated with arbitrating a single claim effectively deny consumer redress, prohibiting class action litigation or class action arbitration is unconscionable."50 The
superior court further explained that "[i]f class action litigation is the only effective remedy, a contract of adhesion cannot preclude such litigation" because the
effect of the class action waiver created corporate immunity." Such a stance, the
superior court reasoned, was justified by Pennsylvania public policy. 52
Explaining its reasoning, the superior court wrote that "[c]lass actions are still
of great public importance" serving as an "essential vehicle by which consumers
may vindicate their lawful rights."5 3 The average consumer stands at a great inequality to the corporate entity, and the class action mechanism serves to resolve
this inequality.54 As the superior court explained, "[I]n Pennsylvania, consumer
class action litigation is of such public importance that public policy considerations allow class action arbitration even if an arbitration agreement does not explicitly so provide."5 Furthermore, such public policy concerns are heightened in
the context of consumers bringing small claims.5 6 Most consumers "having limited financial resources and time, cannot individually present minor claims in
court or in an arbitration."5 If Pennsylvania requires consumers to arbitrate their
small claims individually, "defendant corporations are effectively immunized
from redress of grievances." 58 Therefore, the court concluded, "[I]t is clearly
contrary to public policy to immunize large corporations from liability by allowing them to preclude all class action litigation or arbitration."5 9 Because the consumer and the other class members were seeking minimal damages, the superior
court held that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable under
Pennsylvania law. 60 Although Thibodeau held that Pennsylvania public policy
quently, the consumer learned that neither the cable convertor box nor the remote were required for
basic cable. Id.
47. Thibodeau, 912 A.2d at 876.
48. Id. at 881; 883 ("even language which appears to be facially neutral can nonetheless be unconscionable if its effect is one-sided"); see also Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 596 A.2d 860 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991) (allowing class action arbitration although the arbitration agreement was silent on the
issue); Lytle v. CitiFinancial Servs., Inc. 810 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); McNulty v. H & R
Block, 843 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
49. Thibodeau, 912 A.2d at 883; see also Lytle v. CitiFinacial Servs. Inc., 810 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2002); McNulty v. H & R Block, 843 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
50. Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 883 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (discussing a previous
holding in Lytle v. CitiFinacial Servs. Inc., 810 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)).
51. Id. at 884.
52. Id. at 886.
53. Id. at 884.
54. Id. at 884-85.
55. Id. at 882.
56. Thibodeau, 912 A.2d at 886.
57. Id. at 884.
58. Id. at 885.
59. Id. at 886.
60. Id.
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prohibited class arbitration waivers, the Third Circuit disagreed with the Pennsylvania Superior Court's interpretation of Pennsylvania public policy in Cronin v.
CitiFinancialServices Inc.
In Cronin, the Third Circuit dealt with a class action suit against a lender for
allegedly violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The borrower alleged that by
providing inaccurate loan information to consumer credit agencies, the lender had
damaged borrowers' credit scores. 62 The loan agreement required binding arbitration and waiving class relief.63 The borrower argued that Thibodeau held that
class arbitration waivers were unconscionable under Pennsylvania public policy. 4
The Third Circuit disagreed with the borrower's interpretation of Thibodeau.65
The Third Circuit agreed that Thibodeau represented Pennsylvania public policy rejecting contracts precluding class action relief, but only where "defendant
corporations are effectively immunized from redress or grievances."66 Specifically, Thibodeau involved small damages, and the Third Circuit recognized that "[n]o
individual will expend the time, fees, costs, and or other expenses necessary for
individual litigation or arbitration for this small potential recovery."67 Because the
litigant in Thibodeau sought small damages and therefore, had no incentive to
litigate individually, class waiver would destroy the litigant's claim. 8 The Third
Circuit concluded that Pennsylvania law did not hold class arbitration waivers
unconscionable per se but would only do so if the agreement created corporate
immunity. 69 Therefore, the Third Circuit stressed that "the critical issue is whether the particular class action waiver effectively ensures that a defendant will never
face liability for wrongdoing."70 According to the Third Circuit, this distinguished
Thibodeau from Cronin.
In Cronin, the borrower sought both actual and punitive damages, so his
claim did not involve small damages as in Thibodeau.71 Seeking significant damages, the Third Circuit found that the borrower had plenty of incentive to litigate
individually. 72 Because the potential litigants had incentive to litigate their claims,
Because the lender had no such
the lender was not immunized from liability.
immunity, the Third Circuit held that the arbitration clause was not unenforceable. 74 Yet, the Third Circuit explicitly left open the issue of whether class arbitration waivers were unconscionable due to Pennsylvania public policy. 75 The Third
Circuit again refused to resolve that issue in Kaneff a mere seventy-six days after
61. Cronin, 352 Fed. App'x. at 634; Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
62. Id. at 632.
63. Id. at 634.
64. Id. at 635.
65. Id.
66. Cronin, 352 Fed. App'x. at 635 (quoting Thibodeau, 912 A.2d at 885).
67. Id. (quoting Thibodeau, 912 A.2d at 885-86).
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Cronin, 352 Fed. App'x. at 635-36.
72. Id. at 636. The class representative borrower was a licensed attorney. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Cronin, 352 Fed. App'x. at 635 ("[W]e have not yet directly addressed whether the Pennsylvania
decisions on certain class action waivers set forth a public policy unique to arbitration agreements ...
we need not resolve that issue today").
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Cronin was decided. 7 Perhaps, the Third Circuit did not want to discuss Pennsylvania policy regarding class action waivers because Kaneff provided the court
with two additional policy considerations: the federal policy favoring arbitration
and Pennsylvania's policy prohibiting usurious loans.
C. Third CircuitSeverance of UnconscionableProvisions
Although upholding the arbitration agreement, the Third Circuit severed a
provision from the arbitration agreement in Kaneff" The Third Circuit provided
little explanation for why severance was appropriate, except that it recognized that
"as a matter of substantive federal law, an arbitration provision is severable from
the remainder of the contract."78 The Third Circuit recognized this same federal
policy earlier in Spinetti v. Service Corp. International,which like Kaneff] was
decided under Pennsylvania law.7 9 Because Spinetti discussed federal policy favoring severance and arbitration (the same policies mentioned in Kaneff) and provided more explanation on the severance device itself, the Third Circuit's decision
in Spinetti assists in understanding the issues in Kaneff
In Spinetti, an employee alleged that her employer terminated her due to her
age and gender, violating Title V118 0 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.81 Within
the arbitration agreement, a provision required that both parties pay equal costs in
arbitration and their own attorneys fees. 82 The district court concluded that the
employee had met her factual burden of proof, establishing that she could not
afford the cost arrangements in the arbitration agreement.
Accordingly, the
Third Circuit affirmed that the cost-splitting provision for arbitration was unconscionable." However, the court still enforced arbitration despite two unconscionable provisions within the agreement.85
The Third Circuit chose to sever the unconscionable cost-splitting provision,
enforcing the remainder of the arbitration agreement. The court emphasized that
federal public policy favored enforcement of arbitration agreements. 87 Despite the
unconscionable provisions, "[I]t would be contrary to federal policy to undermine
an entire arbitration agreement based upon a single potentially unenforceable
term."88 The claimant in Spinetti, however, argued that federal policy could not
justify severance in absence of a severance provision, which her contract lacked.
The court disagreed, finding federal policy more persuasive.

76. See Kaneffv. Del. Title Loans, Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 625 (3d Cir. 2009).
77. Id. at 625.
78. Id. at 624 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2005))
79. Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int'l, 324 F.3d 212, 214 (3d Cir. 2003).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006).
81. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b), 216(b) (2006).
82. Spinetti, 325 F.3d at 215.
83. Id. at 217.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 223.
86. Id.at 220.
87. Id. at 213.
88. Spinetti, 325 F.3d at 220 (citing Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 682 (8th Cir.
2001)).
89. Id. at 221.
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The Third Circuit, echoing concerns voiced by the Eighth Circuit, opined that
invalidating entire arbitration agreements every time a provision was determined
invalid would discourage parties from forming contracts under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 90 Therefore, parties would be prevented from structuring
agreements in the most efficient manner possible.9 1 Such a result, the Third Circuit cautioned, "would represent the antithesis of the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." 92 Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that the
FAA's policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements supported its decision to sever unconscionable provisions, while still compelling arbitration.93
Spinetti provides an example of how the federal policy favoring arbitration
necessitates the use of severance. In Spinetti however, the litigant sought to vindicate her rights under a federal statute. 94 Because Spinetti relied on federal policy to deny relief under a federal statute, no conflict existed between state and
federal policy. In Kaneff however, a conflict between state and federal policy did
exist.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The first issue the Third Circuit in Kaneff addressed was whether to apply
Pennsylvania or Delaware's choice of law rules.95 Kaneff brought her claim in
district court based on diversity of citizenship. Diversity jurisdiction required the
Third Circuit to apply the choice of law rules in the state in which the petition was
originally filed.96 Because Kaneff filed her case in Pennsylvania state court, the
Third Circuit followed Pennsylvania's choice of law rules.97 The Third Circuit
then applied Pennsylvania choice of law rules to determine whether there was a
true conflict between application of Delaware law and Pennsylvania law to the
arbitration agreement.98 A true conflict exists if applying the two state laws would
reach different results. If a true conflict existed, then the court had to decide
whether to apply Pennsylvania or Delaware law in evaluating the unconscionability of the arbitration agreement. If no true conflict existed, the court could decide
whether the arbitration provisions were unconscionable directly.
The Third Circuit found that a true conflict existed between application of
Delaware and Pennsylvania law.99 Pennsylvania law appeared more favorable to
Kaneffs claim.'" Specifically, Pennsylvania Act 6101 prohibits charging over a
6% interest rate and allows borrowers, charged in excess of the statutory rate, to

90. Id (citing Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 682 (8th Cir. 2001)).
91. Id
92. Id
93. See id. at 221-22.
94. Id. at 214. The litigant alleged violations under Title VII and the Civil Rights Act. Id.
95. Kaneffv. Del. Title Loans, Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 621 (3d Cir. 2009). Recall that Kaneff, a Pennsylvania resident, had traveled across state lines into Delaware to form her loan agreement. Id. at 618.
96. Id. at 621 (quoting Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 462 (3rd. Cir. 2006)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 622.
101. 41 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 408, 503.
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sue and recover attorneys' fees.102 The Third Circuit found the act's provision
providing recovery of attorneys' fees significant because a key provision in the
arbitration agreement stipulated that the borrower could not recover attorneys' fees
in arbitration.' 03 Although Pennsylvania statutes included a usury law' 4 , the Delaware legislature had created no similar statutes. 05 Phrased differently, though
Pennsylvania provided Kaneff with a statutory right to recover for receiving a
usurious loan, Delaware provided no such statutory right. Having found a true
conflict, the Third Circuit then applied a choice of law analysis to decide whether
Pennsylvania or Delaware substantive law should apply in evaluating the unconscionability of the arbitration agreement.106
Generally, under Pennsylvania choice of law rules, contract cases must apply
the law of the state that the contract specified as choice of law. 07 Delaware Title
Loans (DTL) argued that the terms of the contract specified Delaware as choice of
law. 0 8 Therefore, DTL urged the court to enforce the contract as agreed upon.
However, the Third Circuit stated two exceptions to the general rule that the state
specified in the contract must serve as the choice of law.1" First, if the contract
specified as choice of law a state with "no substantial relationship to the parties or
the transaction and there is no reasonable basis for the parties' choice," the Third
Circuit would not enforce the contracted for choice of law."10 Second, if "application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of
a[nother] state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue," the chosen state could not serve as choice of
law."' Because the contract was signed in Delaware, the court found a substantial
relationship existed between choice of law and the agreement, holding that the
first exception did not apply.1 2 However, the parties disagreed over whether the
second exception would apply, arguing about whether Pennsylvania's "fundamental policy" was implicated so that Pennsylvania had a "materially greater interest"
in the case." 3
Kaneff argued that Pennsylvania had the greater interest in deciding the transaction.114 First, Kaneff argued that she was a consumer residing in Pennsylvania,
and Pennsylvania had a strong policy interest in applying its own consumer protection laws."' 5 Second, as Kaneffs counsel argued in her appeal brief, Pennsylvania law should apply "because Pennsylvania will have to live with the aftermath
of the transaction."" 6 Kaneff posited that should her car be repossessed, causing
102. Kaneffv. Del. Title Loans, Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 622 (3d Cir. 2009).
103. Id.
104. Usury statutes cap the maximum interest rates that a lender may charge. Id. at 622.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 623.
107. Id. at 621.
108. Kaneff, 587 F.3d at 623.
109. Id. at 621-22.
110. Id. at 621 (citing Berg Chilling Systems, Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 463-64 (3rd. Cir.
2006)).
111. Id. at 621-22 (citing Berg, 435 F.3d at 463-64).
112. Id. at 622.
113. Id. at 622-23.
114. Kaneff 587 F.3d at 623.
115. Id
116. Id.
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her to lose her job, Pennsylvania would bear the obligation of paying her unemployment and medical benefits. In such a case, Pennsylvania would also be deprived of taxes from her former income." 7 Kaneff further argued that the collateral of the case, her car, was located in Pennsylvania." 8 In addition, the Pennsylvania usury statute included a non-waiver provision that the statute applies "[n]ot
withstanding any other law."" 9
However, DTL contended that Delaware law should apply because Delaware
had a greater interest in the transaction.120 First, DTL argued that it should be held
to the laws and regulations in the state in which it was incorporated. DTL was a
Delaware corporation, with offices only in Delaware.' 21 Delaware's regulatory
and licensing laws governed DTL and were made by the Delaware State Bank
Commissioner.122 Second, DTL argued Delaware law should apply because the
contract was formed in Delaware; after all, Kaneff had traveled across state lines
to seek their business.123 Ultimately, the court held that Pennsylvania had a greater interest than Delaware.124
In determining that Pennsylvania law should apply, the court relied upon the
Pennsylvania's usury statute as representative of Pennsylvania public policy.'25
Specifically, the court noted the statute's "antipathy to high interest rates such as
the 300.01% interest charged in the contract at issue, represents such a fundamental policy that we must apply Pennsylvania law."' 26 Second, Pennsylvania state
court precedent recognized that regulation of usurious lending touched on public
policy.127 Looking to state precedent, the Third Circuit noted that loans "can affect the social life of the community" and usurious lenders often deploy subterfuge in their methods in attempt to circumvent public policy.128 Third, Pennsylvania had a materially greater interest in regulating usurious loans when they involve "small loans, which profoundly affect the social life of the community."l29
DTL was a payday lender, and a payday loan "generally is for a small amount of
money." 30 Having determined Pennsylvania's usury statute applied to Kaneff,
implicating Pennsylvania public policy prohibiting usurious loans, the Third Circuit discussed federal policy on arbitration.' 3 '
The Third Circuit found two federal policies material to the dispute. 32 First,
"federal law, favors the enforcement of arbitration agreements."' 33 Second, "as a
matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable
117. Id.
118. Id. at 623.
119. Id. at622.
120. Kaneff 587 F.3d at 623.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 623.
124. Id. at 624.
125. Id. at 623-24
126. Kaneff 587 F.3d at 624.
127. Id. at 623-24.
128. Id. at 623.
129. Id. at 623-24.
130. Tara Shinnick, State RegulationofPayday Loans, 29 A.L.R. 6th 461, pt. I, § 2 (2007).
131. Kaneff 587 F.3d at 624.
132. Id. (citing Salley v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 119 n.2 (2007)).
133. Id.
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from the remainder of the contract."' 34 The latter federal policy favoring severance of unconscionable arbitration provisions furthers the broader federal policy
favoring arbitration. If severance allows for enforcement of the arbitration agreement overall, federal policy encourages severance of unconscionable arbitration
provisions.' 3 1 Otherwise, one unconscionable provision could render the entire
arbitration agreement unenforceable, and arbitration would give way to litigation,
counter to federal policy. Having recognized both federal and state policies in its
consideration, the Third Circuit addressed Kaneff's argument that the arbitration
agreement was unconscionable.
Kaneff proffered five reasons why the arbitration provision was unconscionable.' 36 First, Kaneff asserted that the provision allowing the creditor to seek repossession before seeking arbitration left the borrower defenseless against adverse
lender claims.' 3 7 Second, the class action waiver shielded DTL from injunctive
138
relief because the arbitrator had no power to compel DTL to stop illegal acts.
Third, cost-sharing in arbitration and requiring borrowers to pay for their own
39
counsel in arbitration made the process too expensive for consumers to pursue.1
Fourth, the mandatory $125 filing fee prevented low-income borrowers from
seeking arbitration and served as a substantial impediment to bringin small
claims.140 Last, the severance clause insulated DTL from all legal liability.4
Rather than address each argument individually, the Third Circuit disposed of
Kaneffs claim collectively. The Third Circuit wrote "with one exception, we find
for our purposes that those challenges are wanting." 142 The one exception was the
cost-splitting provision.143 The Third Circuit wrote that although the cost-splitting
provision "is likely unconscionable . . . [t]he provision, however, is severable

pursuant to the severability clause of the agreement."'" Because the Third Circuit
found one unconscionable provision and severed that provision from the arbitration agreement, the court held that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable, but enforceable under Pennsylvania law.145 Although the Third Circuit provided little explanation for its decision, the use of severance and the effect of
compelling arbitration coincide with the two federal policies that the Third Circuit
previously mentioned in Kaneff
The direct effect of the Third Circuit's decision was that by severing an unconscionable provision, the arbitration agreement could be enforced.i" Recall,
however, that the Third Circuit had previously noted the federal policy favoring
arbitration and severance in order to enforce arbitration.14 7 Federal policy ultimately compelled the Third Circuit to sever one provision to uphold the arbitra134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Kaneff 587 F.3d at 624 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing Inc., v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. at 445).
See Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int'l, 324 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2003).
Kaneff, 587 F.3d at 624.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kaneff , 587 F.3d at 624.
Id. at 624-25
Id. at 625.
Id
Id.
Id. at 624-25.
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tion agreement. This was hardly novel for the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit in
Spinetti had also relied upon federal policy favoring arbitration to sever unconscionable provisions while compelling arbitration.148 Recognizing and enforcing
federal policy was appropriate, but what the Third Circuit failed to recognize was
the effect of its decision on Pennsylvania public policy. As explained below, the
two policies were incompatible.
V. COMMENT
When the Third Circuit decided Kaneff the Pennsylvania legislature had a
usury statute in place that represented Pennsylvania's public policy regarding
usury loans.149 Pennsylvania's public policy, however, was not the only policy
considered by the Third Circuit. On one hand, Pennsylvania, through its legislature, had crafted a state statute representing public policy prohibiting usurious
lending practices. On the other hand, the Third Circuit had long recognized the
strong federal policy, as codified by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), favoring
resolution of disputes through arbitration. As Kaneff demonstrates the two policy
considerations were incompatible in the resolution of the case.

A. Conflict Between FederalandState Policies
Enforceability of the arbitration agreement depended on whether the class
waiver provision was deemed unconscionable. In Kaneff the Third Circuit was
effectively left with two options, either: uphold or strike down the class waiver. If
the class waiver was held unconscionable, the arbitration agreement would also be
unconscionable. In such a case, Kaneff would not be bound by arbitration, and
Kaneffs class would remain intact. If the class waiver was upheld, however, the
arbitration agreement would be enforced. Kaneff would be bound by arbitration,
but Kaneffs class would be forced to decertify into individual claims. One key
fact complicated the issue-each borrower sought to recover only small damages.
A claim seeking a small recovery amount is often referred to as a "negative
value suit."1 50 Professor Edward Sherman explains a negative value suit to be a
"suit in which the potential recovery to any individual would be too small and the
costs of litigation too large to have an adequate incentive to litigate individually."' 5 ' In the context of Kaneff without adequate incentive to arbitrate individually, no individuals will bring claims against DTL. Without any individual claims
against DTL for issuing usurious loans, Pennsylvania's statute prohibiting usurious loans would often go unenforced. Therefore, the only way to enforce Pennsylvania's usury statute would have been for the court to keep the class intact by
holding the class waiver unconscionable. However, as previously mentioned, the
court in Kaneff also gave weight to the federal policy favoring arbitration. If the
Third Circuit held that the class waiver was unconscionable, Pennsylvania policy
148. Spinetti v. Sery. Corp. Int'l, 324 F.3d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 2003).
149. 41 PA. STAT. ANN. §201 (West current through Act 2010-60).
150. Thomas Metzloff, Arbitrationto Elimate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice
or UnconscionableAbuse?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 88 (2008).
151. Id.
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would be effectuated, but the federal policy favoring arbitration would not. If the
Third Circuit upheld the class waiver, the federal policy would be effectuated but
the Pennsylvania policy prohibiting usurious loans would not. In this irreconcilable conflict between federal and state policy, the Third Circuit had to make a
choice. Giving force to one policy consideration necessarily ignored the other.
Because the Third Circuit upheld the class waiver in Kaneff, the Third Circuit
chose federal policy favoring arbitration over state policy prohibiting usurious
loans. As a result, the Third Circuit enforced arbitration at the expense of permitting the violation of Pennsylvania's usury laws without consequence. The Third
Circuit's recent preference for federal policy over state policy has not gone unnoticed by legal scholars. One commentator has pointed to the Third Circuit's similar favoring of federal policy over state policy in New Jersey, upholding a class
waiver in order to effectuate the arbitration agreement. 152 The consequence of
federal policy trumping state policy in Kaneff has created significant negative
externalities in Pennsylvania. Kaneff created corporate immunity for usurious
lenders. As a result, the Third Circuit prevented deterrence of corporate misconduct and interfered with Pennsylvania's public policy and statutory scheme.
B. Externalitiesand Spillover Effects of Class Actions
As Professor Elizabeth Burch explains, "[c]lass action does more than aggregate claims; it augments government policing and generates external societal benefits. These societal benefits-externalities-are the spillover effects of allowing
class actions to proceed."15 3 Commentators have discussed numerous positive
externalities of the class action mechanism. Some of these positive externalities
include shaping standards of appropriate conduct, reducing judicial costs, preserving judicial resources, deterring corporate misconduct, making attorneys private
enforcers to supplement public regulation, innovation, information sharing, and
preservation of individuals' rights.154
These positive externalities apply broadly to all class actions. However, some
of these externalities do not apply in the context of Kaneff and, therefore, this
note will not discuss every positive externality that class actions generate. Rather,
the scope of this note only encompasses the externalities implicated by Kaneff,
externalities that the Third Circuit should have considered in deciding the case.
By choosing federal policy over state policy and upholding the class waiver provision, the Third Circuit's decision in Kaneff ignored the externalities or spillover
effects of preventing consumers like Kaneff from proceeding through class action
arbitration. The remainder of this note will be devoted to explaining three related
externalities as a result of the Third Circuit's decision in Kaneff
Part C discusses Kaneffs effect of creating corporate immunity. Part D will
explore how Kaneff failed to deter, and therefore, encouraged corporate miscon152. Dave Winters, Note, Third Circuit Buyer Beware: DistrictCourt in Litman Holds Unconscionable Defense ContravenedBy FederalArbitrationAct, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 223 (2010).
153. Elizabeth C. Burch, CAFA's Impact on Litigationas a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517,
2518 (2008).
154. William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?A Positive Externalities Theory of Small Claims
Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REv. 709, 721, 723-25 (2006).
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duct. Part E explains how Kaneff eviscerated and negated Pennsylvania's state
policies and statutory scheme. Taken as a whole, the Third Circuit's decision
created significant externalities for the state of Pennsylvania, considerations that
should not have been ignored by the court.

C. Upholding Class Arbitration Waiver Creates CorporateImmunity
In Kaneff, the Third Circuit upheld the class arbitration waiver under Pennsylvania law. Because the class waiver remained valid, the class that Kaneff was
representing necessarily had to decertify. Without class certification, Kaneff,
along with all the other members of her class, would have to pursue their claims in
arbitration individually. Yet, recall that Kaneff involved small arbitral claims
because the loan agreement was for a payday loan, which "generally is for a small
amount of money." 55 The Third Circuit previously recognized that "[n]o individual will expend the time, fees, costs, and or other expenses necessary for individual litigation or arbitration for this small potential recovery."' 56 Simply put, consumers will not bring claims when the effort, both personal and financial, does not
justify the potential reward.
Not only are consumers unlikely to individually seek small recovery amounts,
attorneys are unlikely to take on such clients.' 5 7 Attorneys have inadequate financial incentive to take on small, individual claims. Attorneys' testimonies in cases
challenging class action bans corroborate this fact, even when the individual
claims have merit.'58 The disincentive to consumers and attorneys to bring small
claims individually, as was the case in Kaneff signifies that de-scertification of
Kaneffs class necessarily signifies the end of any claim against DTL. Nor are
future class actions against DTL likely. Upholding DTL's class waiver preempts
any class actions that may be pursued against DTL in the future. The nature of
DTL's business remains unchanged. It is allowed to continue issuing payday
loans for small amounts, which translates into small damages in litigation. By
upholding DTL's class waiver in Kaneff, the Third Circuit fully immunized the
company from all liability. Creating corporate immunity fails to deter corporate
misconduct and eviscerates Pennsylvania's statutory scheme.

D. DeterringCorporateMisconduct
The possibility of lawsuits generally serves two corporate deterrence functions. 159 First, corporations are less likely to perform illegal acts when there is the
"threat effect" from potential lawsuits.W Second, the threat of a lawsuit provides
incentive for corporations to change unlawful practices and conform their policies
to acceptable business standards, thus benefiting society.' 6 ' Because Kaneff pro155. Tara Shinnick, State Regulation ofPayday Loans, 29 A.L.R. 6th 461, pt. I, § 2 (2007)
156. Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
157. Metzloff, supra note 150, at 88.
158. Id.
159. Elizabeth C. Burch, Securities Class Actions as PragmaticEx Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV.
63, 95 (2008).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 95-96.
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vided corporate immunity to loan companies, neither deterrence function will
exist to protect Pennsylvania consumers from illegal lending practices.
Social studies have long inquired as to why corporate officers lie. The most
often cited reasons include "greed, fear, opportunity, ethical plasticity, and pollyannaism."l 62 These studies then "suggest that if managers rationally engage in
cognitive cost-benefit analysis before outwardly exhibiting false optimism (lying),
then knowing that they will personally suffer some penalty could combat and
lessen those tendencies."l63 In other words, corporate officers are less likely to lie
when they know that if they are caught, they will be punished. Therefore, the
"threat effect" of lawsuits "deters risky behaviors taken without due care and increases candor among corporate managers."164 By upholding the class waiver in
Kaneff the Third Circuit removed the "threat effect" of punishment under Pennsylvania's usury statute and established class waivers as a viable option for use by
corporations to insulate themselves from liability.
Kaneff established that class arbitration waivers were legitimate and valid
contractual instruments in Pennsylvania. After the Third Circuit's decision in
Kaneff any lender in Pennsylvania can craft a class waiver and have a reasonable
expectation that it will be upheld by judicial entities. Nothing will stop usurious
lending corporations from deciding for themselves whether to create corporate
immunity through a class waiver. Allowing corporations to decide for themselves
whether to end the class action mechanism is bad policy. Commentators have
pointed out that "[c]orporate defendants are, however, quick to complain about
excessive American litigation and decry class actions as legalized blackmail."l 65
In light of corporate animosity towards the class mechanism, companies, if provided with the right to use class waivers, will exercise that right.
For example, JAMS is the third largest private arbitral body in the United
States.166 In 2004, JAMS issued a policy disavowing class waivers in arbitration,
"out of the concern that prohibitions unfairly curtail the rights of consumers and
employees." 67 This policy change immediately upset the organization's corporate clientele, including Discover and Citibank.'6 8 These corporations alleged that
JAMS was attempting to "insert itself as a guardian of social policy." 6 As a
result, many of these corporations removed JAMS as an acceptable arbitral forum
for their disputes.o70 Under this corporate pressure, JAMS abandoned its no class
Commentators have concluded that JAMS
waiver policy in March of 2005.'
162. Id. at 93.
163. Id. Ethical plasticity is defined as the process by which one "seeks to make one's rivals look bad
and oneself look good." Donald C. Langeport, Resetting the CorporateThermostat: Lessons from the
Recent FinancialScandals About Self Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 302 (2004). A "Pollyanna" is defined as "a person characterized by irrepressible optimism and a tendency to find good in everything." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 899 (10th ed. 1993).
164. Id. at 95.
165. Burch, supra note 159, at 2526.
166. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-TotalDemise of the Modern
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REv. 373, 411 (2005).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 411-12.
169. Id. at 411.
170. Id. at 411-12.
171. Id. at 412
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abandoned its policy because "the pressure put on JAMS by its corporate clients
was too much to bear."1 72
The example of JAMS illustrates that if corporations have the right to demand
class waivers to limit or remove liability, they will exercise that right. The Third
Circuit's decision in Kaneff provides such a right to lending corporations in Pennsylvania. By approving class waivers, the Third Circuit provides companies with
a roadmap to limit or remove liability altogether. Not only does Kaneff fail to
deter, but implicitly encourages companies to escape liability. Corporations do
not need more protection. Recently, scholars have concluded, "in the ongoing and
ever-mutating battle between plaintiffs' lawyers and protectors of corporate interests, the corporate guys are winning."l 73 Nor does "the obvious asymmetrical
litigation power seen in such cases" between consumers and corporations warrant
additional corporate protection.1 74 Allowing lending companies in Pennsylvania
to choose for themselves whether to create corporate immunity through class arbitration waivers will not only promote corporations to do so, but corporate immunity will also prevent companies already practicing usurious practices from changing those practices.
A second deterrence function that class arbitration can serve is to "catalyze
policy and management changes, the effects of which benefit the public."' 7 5 Class
actions force policy change in three ways. First, companies who have evaded
punishment for an unlawful policy have no incentive to change that policy.176 For
example, after Kaneff, having faced no consequences under the Pennsylvania's
usury statute, DTL may continue to issue loans with interest rates of 300%. After
all, if a class waiver provided immunity once, there is no reason for DTL to believe that it cannot rely on the class waiver time and time again.
Second, class actions have a greater deterrent effect on corporate policies than
individual claims.' 7 7 Professor Jean Sternlight points out that individual claims
may not necessarily compel policy changes.1 78 For example, a "company may
find it worthwhile to pay off a few individual claims but keep its overall policy."17 9 Compensating "those very few customers who are enterprising enough to
complain about an illegal policy" may be justified if keeping that illegal policy is
economically lucrative.so In Kaneff borrowers challenging individual loans can
be bought out relatively inexpensively because the loan amounts are small. If
individual loans were aggregated, however, the settlement amounts would be substantial, creating a greater likelihood that DTL would stop issuing usurious loans.
Third, allowing the class to proceed through arbitration helps shape guidelines and norms for companies to follow.'8 1 If claims are allowed to continue
through the class mechanism, "legal principles developed in the case will create
172. Id.
173. Gilles, supra note 166, at 375.
174. David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class
Actions for FutureLoss, 88 VA. L. REv. 1871, 1906 n.62 (2002).
175. Burch, supra note 159, at 96.
176. Id. at 95, 102.
177. See Metzloff, supranote 150, at 90.
178. Id
179. Id
180. Id
181. Rubenstein, supra note 154, at 726.
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more certainty in structuring social behavior,"1 82 providing explanation and examples of appropriate conduct. Corporations like DTL are given guidance regarding
what to do to avoid future lawsuits. Had the Third Circuit allowed the claim
against DTL to proceed, a final and binding decision would have provided instructions and appropriate guidelines to DTL and other lending companies with appropriate guidelines. Even if the parties settled and no final decision was ever
reached, deterrence of illegal policies would still have been achieved. According
to Professor William Rubenstein, "settlements, as well as judicial decrees, produce positive externalities: they change behavior beyond the parties to the initial
suit."' 83 Therefore, settling with Kaneffs class may have forced DTL to stop
issuing usurious loans to avoid future settlement payments. Because Kaneff eliminated the lawsuit against DTL, no instruction is provided for other lending companies to follow.
By creating corporate immunity, the Third Circuit provided DTL no incentive
to change its usurious lending practices and denied judicial or settlement clarification to other lenders. The Third Circuit in Kaneff sent a clear message to lending
corporations to disregard Pennsylvania laws and public policy. Along with sending such a pro-corporate message, the Third Circuit clearly upset Pennsylvania's
statutory scheme and diminished legislative law-making authority.
E. Interference with Pennsylvania'sPolicy and Regulatory Scheme
Because Pennsylvania had a usury statute prohibiting usurious lending practices and Kaneff created corporate immunity for usurious lenders, the Third Circuit overrode Pennsylvania public policy prohibiting usurious loans. By overriding Pennsylvania's policy with federal policy favoring arbitration, the Third Circuit disrupted Pennsylvania's regulatory scheme and public policy in two ways.
First, the Third Circuit's decision has completely eviscerated a Pennsylvania state
statute of any meaningful force. As a result, the entire Pennsylvania state regulatory scheme is at risk of judicial destruction. Second, diminishing the force of
state statutes naturally decreases the validity and authority of the legislature to
create laws.
In Kaneff the Third Circuit concluded that Pennsylvania had a "materially
greater interest" than Delaware in deciding the dispute because the Pennsylvania
legislature had crafted a usury statute.'
The usury statute constituted Pennsylvania's "fundamental policy .. . particularly when it comes to cases involving small
loans."s85 However, the Third Circuit, by creating corporate immunity in Kaneff
negated any validity or force that "fundamental policy" may have had.
Pennsylvania's usury statute is clear. Lenders may not charge an annual interest rate of over six percent.'8 6 DTL's loan to Kaneff included an annual interest
rate of 300%, in clear violation of the statute.' 8 7 However, as previously discussed, DTL will face no consequences for violating the statute because Kaneff
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 724.
Kaneff, 587 F.3d at 624.
Id. at 623-24.
Id. at 622; 41 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201 (West current through Act 2010-60).
Kaneff, 587 F.3d at 622.
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provided the lender with corporate immunity. When violations of a statute occur
but enforcement is lacking, the statute becomes meaningless. If including a class
waiver can fully immunize usurious lenders, then Pennsylvania's usury statute has
no force whatsoever. All corporate lenders can now follow the lead of DTL and
include class waivers to circumvent Pennsylvania public policy. Essentially, the
statute may still bark, but there is no bite. By negating the force of one Pennsylvania statute, Kaneff risks interference with Pennsylvania's entire regulatory
scheme.
The effect of the Third Circuit's decision does more than merely void one
Pennsylvania statute. Narrowly, Kaneff represents federal policy favoring arbitration overriding Pennsylvania policy prohibiting usury loans. Broadly, Kaneff
represents federal law overriding an unrelated state law. The larger implication is
that Kaneff can be read to permit federal statutes to supersede state statutes, even
when the two statutes do not directly conflict. Therefore, the effect of diminishing
the validity of one particular Pennsylvania statute creates the larger risk that additional Pennsylvania state laws can be voided through application of the FAA in
similar fashion. Reading Kaneff expansively, the state's entire regulatory scheme
is at risk of judicial interference. Weakening state-crafted laws has additional
implications because it weakens a state legislature's authority to craft those laws.
State laws are crafted by legislatures. If the legitimacy of state laws is implicated, then so is the legitimacy of state legislatures. The Third Circuit in Kaneff
has not only eviscerated the legitimacy of state regulation, but it has also diminished the power of state legislative branches to form state regulation. Yet, the
Third Circuit in Kaneff recognized the uniqueness of legislatures in crafting state
statutes. Kaneff recognized that the legislature, or specifically the Pennsylvania
Department of Banking, had "special knowledge of how such loans can affect the
social life of the community."' 8 8 By recognizing that the social life of the Pennsylvania community required protection from usurious lenders, the Pennsylvania
legislature utilized their "special knowledge" in crafting the usury statute. Negating the usury statute decreases the legitimacy of the legislature in crafting enforceable state laws. Without absolute assurance that statutes will be upheld and
enforced, legislative lawmaking power becomes speculative, lacking the absolute
force legislators deserve with their "special knowledge" of their constituents'
needs. These constituents are Pennsylvanian consumers, and without legislative
or statutory protection, the worst of times for consumers has arrived.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit in Kaneff upheld the class arbitration waiver at issue in the
case. The court determined that it was not unconscionable under Pennsylvania
law and because the cost-splitting provision was unconscionable but severable, the
arbitration agreement as a whole was not unconscionable under Pennsylvania
law. 8 9 The court's decision reflects an indirect conflict between federal and state
policies. In order to effectuate the federal policy favoring arbitration, the Third
Circuit had to override Pennsylvania's policy prohibiting usurious loans. Kaneff
188. Kaneff 587 F.3d at 623 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 624-25.
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had a larger impact than merely ignoring one state policy, however. The externalities arising from non-enforcement of the state policy are substantial.
By creating corporate immunity for lending companies in Pennsylvania, the
Third Circuit deprived Pennsylvania consumers of their statutory right to be protected from usurious lending practices. Without fear that consumers may sue
under Pennsylvania's usury statute, lending companies face no consequences for
their actions under Pennsylvania law. Pennsylvania law on usurious practices,
then, has no force. The state's entire regulatory scheme is at risk of being diminished or negated altogether by federal policies. Without absolute assurance that
legislative acts will receive judicial enforcement, the power of legislatures is also
diminished. These externalities, if considered by the Third Circuit, may have
compelled the court to a different result in Kaneff In absence of such consideration, commentators have suggested two potential solutions to preserve the external
benefits of class actions.
First, Congressional action could depart from the case-by-case approach and
disparate judicial treatment of class actions by completely prohibiting class waivers in arbitration. 190 Professor Stemlight suggests that even "[i]f Congress thought
such a general prohibition too broad, it could at least prohibit the practice with
respect to arbitration agreements imposed on consumers and employees." 191 Such
legislative action targeted specifically at consumers would protect small payday
borrowers like Kaneff. Even without Congress, the executive branch "might step
in to fill the enforcement vacuum created by the absence of collective litigation."' 92
Second, Green Tree may provide a workable framework for litigants to preserve their statutory rights through class arbitration.193 In order to render an arbitration agreement unconscionable, Green Tree placed the burden on litigants to
prove that arbitration would be too expensive for the litigant to bear.' 94 In the
context of Kaneff the burden could be placed on Kaneff to prove that the class
action waiver would deny her statutory right to vindication in arbitration. Faced
with creating corporate immunity, courts would likely find that Kaneff satisfies
this burden. However, until Congressional action or Green Tree is extended to
class arbitration, impetus for change is left to the courts. Until the Third Circuit
realizes the necessity of the class action mechanism in the context of payday
loans, Pennsylvania consumers will continue to be deprived of the statutory protection that their legislature, as elected by citizens of Pennsylvania, chose to provide.
DAVID MA

190. See Gilles, supranote 166, at 428; Metzloff, supra note 151, at 101.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Metzloff, supranote 150, at 101.
Gilles, supranote 166, at 428.
Thomas Metzloff, supranote 150, at 77, 100.
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 81 (2000).
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